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Open Market Operations and Monetary Variables:
A Simulation of Plausible Policies
by
William R. Bryan and A. James He ins
The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of alternative
open-market policies on interest rates and the reserve base of the banking
system. We do this by simulating experience in a simple world in which
interest rates and reserves are determined by federal reserve policy
responding to shocks to the supply and demand for reserves. Among the
propositions we explore are: (1) that an attempt to moderate interest
rate movements introduces added variation in reserves; (2) that an attempt
to offset unwanted changes in the reserve base reduces the variation in
reserves; and (3) that a "proviso clause" in open-market policies may
introduce perverse results in interest rate and reserve performance over
time.
In the first section of the paper, we lay out the simulation model.
In the second section we present the simulation results for alternative
Federal Reserve open-market strategies. And, in the final section we
offer concluding remarks
.
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I. The Simulation Model
In this section we describe our efforts at replicating the character-
istics of the market in which the Federal Reserve conducts open market
operations . In developing the model we leaned heavily on an excellent
description by Stephen H. Axilrod.
Axilrod discusses at some length the "constellation" of money market
conditions against which short-term operations of the Fed are directed.
The constellation is limited to those variables among which "trade offs"
can be managed in producing a given degree of restraint or ease in the
money market. It includes the Federal funds rate, borrowings of member
banks, net free or net borrowed reserves, and, at times, the three-month
Treasury bill rate. In this study we permit a single rate — call it the
"constellation rate" — to proxy for the constellation of rates. We, and
the reader, probably would not be led too far astray if we viewed the
"constellation rate" as the Federal funds rate. As indicated, we specify
the constellation rate as the one that just "clears the market" for bank
reserves
.
Our first behavioral proposition is that, other things equal, the
lower the constellation rate, the greater the quantity of reserves demanded
by the banking system (see DD of Figure l). We view the reserve base of
the banking system as given — independently of the level of the constel-
lation rate (see SS of Figure l).
Axilrod, Stephen H., "The FOMC Directive as Structured in the Late
1960's: Theory and Appraisal," Open Market Policies and Operating
Procedures — Staff Studies , Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, 1971.
throughout the article Axilrod places heavy stress on the Federal
funds rate as a "principal operating variable."
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Flgure 1
Reserves

The demand function is given by the linear relation
(1) RD
= Z - b r*;
where: R = bank reserves demanded,
Z = a term summarizing the effect of all other variables, and,
r the constellation rate
.
Z, shown for convenience as a constant term in (l), incorporates the
effects of random, seasonal, and cyclical shifts in demand. Even though
it is likely that variations in Z result to a substantial extent from
systematic factors, in our simulations we permit the demand schedule to
take a random walk. That is, after setting Z to an initial value, each
of its subsequent values represents the summation of shocks to that value.
Put another way: Z. «= Z. , + E, E a shock term with mean 0, and standard
deviation o*,. The reserve supply function is in the form:
(2) R_ = FRC + E;
where : FRC <* -a Federal Reserve controlled component, and
,
E = a shock term with a mean of K and a standard deviati-on
of a .
s
One may imagine that E consists of the reserve effects stemming from
float, the Treasury balance, currency in circulation, gold flows, and
foreign drawings or repayments on swap lines . To assert that there is a
component amenable to control, FRC, is merely to suggest that the Fed has
sufficient knowledge of all other factors within that component to offset
unwanted changes -- for example, in borrowing — by open market operations.
As suggested above, we specify the constellation rate, r in Figure l t
as the one that just "clears the market." That is, it eliminates short-
run bank demands for (or supplies of) reserves. Thus, in equilibrium:
(3) Rd = Es
--
'
r;
• '
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A few remarks regarding the simulations will be helpful. Each run
consists of U08 "days . " We have generated a set of random shocks to
reserves (E) and to credit demands (Z). As indicated above, E has a mean
of 0. It turns out that the random walk taken by Z implies an increase
in credit demands over the U08°day period.
II. The Consequences of Alternative Fed Operating Procedures
Within the context of the model specified above we superimpose
several alternative Federal Reserve open market strategies. Basically,
we are interested in contrasting operating strategies oriented toward
interest rates with those oriented toward reserves. In addition, however,
we experiment with strategies that seek to combine interest rate con-
straints with reserve base constraints
.
Interest Rate Limits Vs . Simple Offsetting
Our initial simulation experiments contrast the results of a simple-
minded interest rate strategy with a correspondingly simple reserve
strategy. In addition, each of these strategies is contrasted with one
of doing nothing at all. The interest rate strategy involves limiting the
extent to which the constellation rate will move on any given "day.
Operationally, our simulations permit the market" clearing rate to move no
more than five basis points from yesterday's rate. A movement equal to or
less than five basis points will not trigger an open market operation of
any kind. However, if shocks — either to Z (reflecting shifts in credit
demands) or E (reflecting random shifts in the reserve base) — result
Je refer to every completed "loop'' in our simulation run as a "day."

-6-
in an "out of bounds" constellation rate, open market operations are
triggered. Specifically, open market operations occur up to the point
where there is no more than a five basis-point difference between yester-
day's and today's constellation rate.
The reserves" oriented strategy with which we contrast the interest
rate strategy simply involves a lagged offset to yesterday's reserve
shock. That is, if reserves declined 50 units yesterday (by virtue of a
random shock, E), the Federal Reserve makes a purchase of 50 units today.
We consider two dimensions in comparing results of these two open
market strategies. The first basis of comparison involves looking at the
variance of the variables with which we are concerned. It may be, for
example, that efforts to reduce variance in a variable actually serve to
increase it. Or, more. likely, efforts to stabilize one variable may
introduce instability in another. Indeed, there is a widely-held belief
that efforts to "peg" or moderate movements in a price (interest rates)
will result in increased variation in quantities (bank reserves and the
money supply) . There has been a moderate amount of research addressed to
k
this question. The second basis for comparison involves looking at
cumulative movements in variables with which we are concerned. It may be,
for example, that efforts to stabilize one variable may introduce unwanted
cumulative movements in another.
Bonomo, Vittorio and Charles Schotta, "Federal Open Market Operations
and Variations in the Reserve Base , " Journal of Finance , 25(June, 1970),
659-67; , "A Spectral Analysis of Post-Accord Open Market Opera-
tions ," ^^£J£^r^conomic_Reviev , **9(March, I969)
,
50-61; Bryan, William R.
and A. James Heins, Defensive Open Market Operations, Proximate Objectives
and Monetary Instability," Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking , February,
1972, Vol. U, No. 1, 97-108.
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Looking at the results of the initial simulations, it turns out that
the strategy oriented toward limiting changes in interest rates resulted
in a smaller variance in the constellation rate than was the case with
alternative operating procedures (see Table I) . Indeed, the variance in
the "bounded" interest rates was about one -seventh the variance resulting
from a hands- off strategy.
As expected, the strategy directed toward limiting, or moderating,
changes in interest rates resulted in a larger cumulative expansion in
bank reserves and money than did strategies directed toward offsetting all
changes in reserves or engaging in no open market operations (see Figure
2). Such a result emerged from the fact that — as it turned out, the
random walk in credit demands served to increase demands on balance over
the U08-day period. Thus, the Fed frequently found itself "pegging" from
above — i.e., buying to hold interest rates down. The other side of
this coin is that there was a greater cumulative upward movement in
interest rates in the reserves-oriented operating strategies (see Figure
2).
Contrary to our expectations, the strategy directed toward limiting
fluctuations in interest rates also served to moderate fluctuations in
reserves. We have already noted that by "pegging" interest rates, a
cumulative upward movement was introduced into the reserve base. This
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Figure 2
Alternative Operating Procedures
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result was expected. At the same time, however, the variance in reserves
changes was more than cut in half (see Table I) . While this result was
not expected, in retrospect, the explanation seems quite clear. A slight
detour is necessary to develop a frame. -vork within which the problem can
be explicated.
Table I
Comparison of Alternative Operating Procedures
Measures of Fluctuations in:
Policies
Interest Rate Limits
Offsetting Reserve Changes
No Open Market Operations
Proviso Clause
Changes in
Reserves
(Variance)
0.2
1.6
0.5
O.k
Level of
Reserves
8.0
0.7
0.1*
2.1
Changes in
Interest Rates
(Variance) (Standard Deviation)
.000*4
.0028
.0026
.0007
The variance in reserves emerges as a result of the variance of E,
a shock term, and whatever variance the open market strategy introduces
into FRC, the component controlled by the Federal Reserve (see Equation 3).
This variance is given by
(U) VAR Rc = VAR FRC + VAR E + 2 C0V(FRC, E),b
The variance in interest rates emerges as a result of the variance
in reserves and the variance in credit demands . This variance is given
by
(5) VAR r* = -2 [VAR R + VAR Z - 2 C0V(R_, Z)]b" l S ^"S :
An examination of (5) indicates that an aspect of reducing the variance
in r* is to reduce the variance in R . In addition, the variance in r* is
a
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reduced to the extent that there is a positive covariance between R and
Z. Continuing our examination of these definitional statements, an
inspection of (k) indicates that, given the stochastic term, E, the only
way the variance in R can be reduced is by bringing about a negative
covariance between FRC and E.
The question can now be meaningfully framed. Why do open market opera-
tions (FRC) designed to limit changes in r* serve to bring about a negative
covariance between FRC and E? Appropriately combining (l)
, (2), and (3) we
see that changes in r* are given by
(6) Ar* = - [AZ - AFRC - AE]
.
Or, in words, interest rates will move up as credit demands (Z)
increase; they will move down in the face of open market purchases (FRC)
or a random increase in other factors affecting the reserves base (e) .
To stabilize interest rates, an increase in E must be countered by an open
market sale (a decline in FRC); a decline in E must be countered by an
open market purchase (an expansion in FRC). Thus, a strategy of stabi-
lizing r* introduces negative covariance between FRC and E. The explana-
tion is complete.
To summarize, our initial simulations produced the following results:
By limiting movements in interest rates, (l) there was a reduction in the
variance in interest rate movements (as contrasted with engaging in no
open market operations at all or with simple offsetting); (2) there was
a cumulative upward movement in the reserve base of the banking system
(reflecting the fact that the random wall: in credit demands involved a
cumulative increase; (3) the level of interest rates in the terminal
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period was reduced; and (k) there was a reduction in the variance of
changes in reserves. The first three findings were anticipated; the
fourth finding was surprising.
One additional finding can be profitably reported. As might have
been expected, the simple offset policy was counterproductive in all
respects. This result emerges by virtue of the fact that the simple off-
set policy — in which a single stochastic time series is lagged — amounts
to summing variables that have zero contemporaneous covariance.
Interest Rate Limits "- Proviso on Reserves
As an alternative to specifying a short- run operating target wholly
in terms of a single variable, it is possible to envisage a target based
on contingencies. In this vein, the Federal Open Market Committee has
experimented with the use of operating instructions containing a so-called
"proviso clause.
"
In light of these considerations, we simulated an open market strat-
egy oriented principally toward limiting interest rate movements, but also
taking recent movements in the reserves base into account. Specifically,
we made our actions to maintain a five basis-point limit on movements in
the constellation rate depend upon how rapidly the reserve base had been
changing over the preceding week. Prior to responding to a signal to
buy (sell) in the open market to reduce (increase) the level of the con-
stellation rate to the five basis-point deviation from its dayearlier
position, we calculated the annual rate of change in the reserve base from
the previous week.
5
Our "weeks" consist of five-period moving averages of daily figures.
A week-to-week change consists of the difference between contiguous
moving averages
.
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If bank reserves had been changing at less than a 10 percent annual
rate, then interest rate changes would be limited to no more than a five
basis-point movement. If, on the other hand, bank reserves had been
expanding (contracting) at more than a 10 percent annual rate, no purchase
(sale) would be made. Thus, instead of limiting interest rate movements,
we would simply permit the rate to move to a level that cleared the
market without central bank intervention.
We had expected the "proviso clause" strategy to result in a less
rapid increase in bank reserves than with the "pegging" strategy. We had
also expected the "proviso clause" strategy to result in a somewhat higher
level of interest rates. At the same time, with the proviso clause strat-
egy we expected bank reserves to grow more than they would have either in
the absence of open market operations, or with simple offsetting; by the
same token, we expected interest rates to be lower than under either of
these regimes
.
As it turned out, bank reserves actually fell under the proviso clause
strategy. This result was surprising. Recall that reserves rose rapidly
under the interest rate bounding regime . Also recall that the intent of
the proviso clause was simply to moderate the growth in bank reserves —
while directing chief effort at bounding interest rates. Contrary to
intent, reserves fell, on balance, and interest rates rose more than
they would have if the central bank had engaged in no open market opera-
tions at all. Such a result was perverse to the main thrust of the
interest rate bounding strategy, (see Figure 2.)
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It is also of interest to examine the effect of the proviso clause
on short-run fluctuations in reserves and interest rates. The variance
of changes in reserves under the proviso clause -- a clause designed to
limit short-term movements — is not significantly different from the
variance associated with a "do nothing ' regime. The variance in the level
of reserves under the proviso clause is substantially greater than under
the "do nothing" regime. The proviso clause strategy =- as with the
regime that simply bounded interest rates ™- resulted in a substantial
reduction in the fluctuation of interest rates.
III. Concluding Remarks
The results of our simulations ~~ albeit with a simple model and
equally uncomplicated monetary management procedures — reinforce conclu-
sions that have counterparts throughout the field of economics, as well
as other disciplines. Namely, we demonstrate that actions taken to bring
about a wanted change in one variable may introduce an unwanted change in
another. More broadly, our simulations demonstrate the proposition that
efforts to bring about a set of changes in several variables may actually
serve to frustrate those results.
Turning to specifics, we found that efforts to limit changes in inter-
est rates brought about cumulative changes in bank reserves. We expected
these results. It was already understood that by holding interest rates
down the monetary authority would act as an 'engine of inflation," and
conversely. It turned out, however, that what was true in a longer run
setting (cumulative results) was not true of the short run. That is,
efforts to moderate movements in interest rates also served to limit day-
to-day changes in reserves. This was a surprise.
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Simulations in which the monetary authority pursued twin short-run
objectives produced surprising results. In light of the rapid expansion
in reserves produced by the interest rate "pegging" simulation, we intro-
duced a "proviso clause" designed to limit the rate at which reserves
expanded or contracted. By the "proviso clause" we expected to approach
a middle ground set of results. That is, we expected interest rates to
rise somewhat more and reserves to rise somewhat less. Surprisingly,
reserves actually declined over the period, and interest rates rose a
great deal.
Results such as those reported here highlight the difficulties
involved in monetary management — as contrasted with monetary policy
formulation. It is not a simple task to produce wanted changes in monetary
policy variables, leaving aside the question whether those changes are
sensible within an economic stabilization context.
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